History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

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Mimamsa and Nyaya - Vaiseṣika
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no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot be any contact (samyoga) or inherence (samavaya) of dharma and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator, no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, sṛṣṭi or pralaya.
Mīmāmsā as philosophy and Mīmāmsā as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mīmāmsā agrees in the main with Vaiseṣika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rūpa, rasa, etc. Kumārila's differences on the points of jāti, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara's peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumārila was influenced by Samkhya thought rather than by Nyāya. Sāmkhya and Vaiseṣika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and Kumārila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaiseṣika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika about the world was most suitable.
The main difference of Mimāmsā with Nyaya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the selfvalidity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions