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VIII]
Doctrine of Soul
363
some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self is not proved according to Nyāya merely by the notion of our self-consciousness, as in the case of Mimāmsā, for Nyāya holds that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of ātman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at the same time in all places (vibhu), and does not travel with the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though ātman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness as a result of suitable collocations?
Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.
Isvara and Salvation. Nyāya seeks to establish the existence of īśvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Sāmkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of īśvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyāya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of īśvara by an inference of the sāmānyato-drsta type.
Jñānasanavāyanibandhanamevātmanaścetayitrtvam, &c. See Nyāyamañjari, pp. 432 ff.