History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

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The Nyāya-Vaiseșika Philosophy [CH. in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantābhāva (a negation which always exists——e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed)”.
The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices
for the seeker of Salvation. It is probable that the Nyāya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, nirnaya, vāda, jalpa, vitandā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna.
Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. When there is doubt (samsaya) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nirnaya means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an ātman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called a vāda. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A jalpa is called a vitandā when it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvābhāsas are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. Nyāya sūtras enumerate five fallacies (hctvābhāsas) of the middle (hetu): savyabhicāra (erratic), viruddha (contradictory), prakaranasama (tautology), sādhyasama (unproved reason) and kālātīta (inopportune). Savyabhicāra is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakaranasama is that
1 The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.