History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

Page 2095

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The theory of Avidyā refuted
279
veil, there would be objection on the part of the Sankarites to admitting such a removal, which may well be effected by the cognitive state or the pramāṇa-vṛtti. In such a case, however, the removal of the veil is not of the ordinary nature; for this ajñāna, which consists only in the fact that the entity is unknown, is different from the ajñāna the extent and limit of which can be regarded as a positive ignorance having the same defining reference as the object of cognition. In this view, therefore, the ajñāna is to be defined as that which has the capacity of producing errors, since there cannot be any error with regard to the substantive part, the "this." The fact that it remains unknown until cognized involves no ajñāna according to our definition. Thus it may well be supposed that in the case of the cognition of the "this" there is, according to the definition contemplated in the scheme of the inference of ajñāna under discussion, no removal of ajñāna.
In the case of continuous perception, though the object may remain the same, yet a new time-element would be involved in each of the succeeding moments, and the removal of the veil may be regarded as having a reference to this new factor. It is well known that according to the Sankarites time can be perceived by all the pramāņas. Again, the objection that, since material objects can have no veil and since the ajñāna cannot be said to hide pure consciousness which is its support, it is difficult to say which of these is veiled by ajñāna, is not valid; for, though the pure consciousness exists in its self-shining character, yet for its limited appearance, as "it exists," "it shines," ajñāna may be admitted to enforce a limitation or veiling and to that extent it may be regarded as a veil upon that pure consciousness. Madhusudana further adds arguments in favour of the view that ajñāna can be inferred; these are of a formal nature and are, therefore, omitted here.
The theory of Avidyā refuted.
Vyasa-tirtha says that it cannot be assumed that an entity such as the avidya must exist as a substratum of illusion, since otherwise illusions would be impossible; for it has been shown before that the definition of avidya as the material cause of illusion is untenable. Moreover, if it is held that illusions such as the conch-shell-silver are made out of a stuff, then there must also be a producer who