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252 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. yet there is an illusion. Moreover, the difference conceived in a particular manner cannot thwart the imposition of identification of any two entities in other forms; thus, though the opposition between the perceiver and the perceived, self and the not-self, is quite obvious in this particular form, yet the distinction between “ being" and “jug" is not at all apparent; for the notion of the jug is permeated through and through by the notion of being, so that there is no difficulty in conceiving the possibility of false identification between the being and the jugl. Moreover, nature as being is an object of all cognition, so that, though formless like time, it can well be conceived to be an object of visual perception, like time?
The world-illusions occur in a successive series, the later ones being similar to the previous ones. This is all the condition that is needed; it is not at all necessary that the illusory forms that are imposed should also be real. It is sufficient that there should be a cognition of certain forms giving place to certain other forms. What is necessary for a silver-illusion is that there should be a knowledge of silver; that the silver should also be real is quite unimportant and accidental. So the reality of the world-appearance as an entity is never the condition of such an illusion. The objection that, following the same analogy, it may also be contended that the reality of the locus of illusion is quite uncalled-for and that an awareness of such a locus is all that is needed in explaining an illusion, is invalid; for the locus of illusion is not the cause of illusion through awareness of it, but through ignorance of it. Moreover, if the reality of the locus of reality is not demanded as a pre-condition of illusion, contradiction of illusion will be meaningless; for the latter dispels only the illusory notion regarding a real entity.
The objection that, if the world-illusion is capable of practical efficiency and behaviour, it cannot be regarded as invalid, is untenable; for dreams also have some kind of practical efficiency. The story in the scriptural texts of the creation of the sky from the self need not lead us to think of the reality of such scriptural texts; for the scriptures speak of the dream-creations also. The objection
i na hi rūpāntarena bheda-graho rūpāntarenādhyāsa-virodhi. san-ghata ityādi-pratyaye ca sad-rūpasyātmano ghatādy-anuvidhāyatayā bhānun na tasya ghatādy-adhyāsādhisthānā-nupapattiḥ. Advaita-siddhi, p. 495.
2 sad-rūpena ca sarva-jñāna-visayatopapatter na rūpādi-hinasyāpy ātmanah kālasyeva cāksusatvādy anupapattiḥ. Ibid. p. 495.
| SR No. | 007593 |
| Book Title | History of Indian Philosophy |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Surendranath Dasgupta |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Publication Year | 1922 |
| Total Pages | 2517 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English |
| File Size | 125 MB |