History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

Page 2059

XXIX] Nature of Knowledge
243 So in the case of mediate cognition the knowledge is of a mental state, and not of an object, whereas in immediate perception the illumination is of the object through the association of the vrtti. In the case of mediate cognition there is no way by which the antahkarana could go out.
To the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha that it is absurd to think of the antaḥkarana as taking the shape of gross physical objects, Madhusūdana's reply is that “taking the shape of an object" only means the capacity of the vrtti to remove the veil of ajñāna which had stood in the way of the affirmation of the existence of the object; thus the functioning of the vrtti consists only in the removal of the veil of ajñāna.
To the objection that, if the pure consciousness is veiled by ajñāna, no cognition is possible, Madhusūdana's reply is that, though ajñāna in its extensive entirety may remain intact, yet a part of it may be removed by coming into association with the vrtti, and thus the object may be revealed.
To the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha that in the last emancipatory intuition one would expect that the antaḥkarana should have the form of Brahman as object (which is absurd, Brahman being formless), the reply of Madhusūdana is that the Brahman which forms the object of the last immediate intuition, being absolutely unconditioned, does not shine as associated with any particular form. The manifestation of objects in worldly experience is always with specific condition, whereas, the object of this last manifestation being without any condition, the absence of any form is no objection to it; its cognition results in the absolute cessation of all ajñāna and thus produces emancipation. Again, the objection that, if during dreamless sleep the antaḥkarana is dissolved, then on reawakening there will be new antaḥkaraņa, and thus the deeds associated with the former antaḥkaraṇa will have no continuity with the new antaḥkarana, is invalid; for even in deep sleep the causal antaḥkaraṇa remains, what is dissolved being the manifested state of the antaḥkarana.
Again, the objection that there cannot be any reflection in the antaḥkaraña because it has neither manifest colour (udbhūtārūpatvāt) nor visibility, is invalid; for what may be regarded as the
astitvādi tad-vişayaka - vyavahāra-pratibandhaka-jñāna-nivartana - yogyatvasya tad-ākāratua-rūpatvāt. Ibid. p. 483.