History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

Page 2023

XXIX] On the Falsity of the World
207 entities as they are known, and in that case even the reality of Brahman would be conditional, namely, so far as it is known. Again, absolute negation (sarvatra traikālika-nişedha-pratiyogitvam) cannot be distinguished from what is known as chimerical entities. And, if the world-appearance could be an object of absolute negation, its status would be no better than that of chimerical entities (e.g., the hare's horn).
In reply to the objections of Vyāsa-tirtha against the definition of falsehood, that, if falsehood be real, then that implies dualism, and that, if falsehood is false, that implies re-affirmation of the world as real, Madhusūdana says that, since the denial is itself identical (so far as its ultimate ground is concerned) with Brahman, the reality of falsehood does not imply dualism; for the reality of the denial does not imply the reality of the phenomenon, denial of which has been denied by the denial of all phenomena. It has only so much reality as is implied in the ground of all phenomena, which is the Brahman. Again, the falsehood of the falsehood does not imply the affirmation of the reality of the world-appearance; for in the case of the conch-shell-silver, though it is known that not only was it false, but, since it is never existent, it never exists, and never will exist, and the attribution of falsity to it is also false, the conchshell-silver is not for the matter of that re-affirmed as real. It is wrong to suppose that the falsity of the falsity or the denial of the denial is re-affirmation in all cases; it is only when the reality and the denial have the same status and identically the same scope that the denial of the denial means an affirmation; but, when the scope of their meaning varies, the denial of the denial does not imply an affirmation. It may further be pointed out that, when the denial of the denial is intended to re-affirm the positive entity, the denial of the denial leads to affirmation. But, when a denial denies both the positive entity and the denial (which is itself taken as an independent entity), the second denial does not lead to affirmation". The denial of the world-appearance is the denial of the relaity of the very world-appearance as such (svarūpena), like the denial of the conch-shell-silver. The fact that the world-appearance is
Tatra hi nisedhasya nişedhe pratijogi-sattvam āyāti, yatra mişedhasya nisedha-buddhyā pratiyogisattvam vyavasthāpyate, na nişedha-mātram nişedhyate, yathā rajate na idam rajatam iti jñānāantaram idam na arajatam iti jñānena rajatam vyavasthāpyate. yatra tu prati-yogi-nisedhayot ubhayot api nişedhas tatra na prati-yogi-sattvam. Advaita-siddhi, pp. 105-6.