________________
114 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras [CH. real, and can be removed only through knowledge by the grace of God.
The idea suggested by the Sankara school, that the notion of an individual as free agent or as one enjoying his experiences is inherent in the ego (aham-kāra), and is simply associated with the self, is also incorrect; for the notion of ego (aham-kāra) really belongs to the self and it is present as such even during deep sleep (suşupti), when nothing else shines forth excepting the self, and we know that the experience of this state is “I sleep happily". This notion “I," or the ego, therefore belongs to the selfı.
If everything is false, then the very scriptures by which Sankara would seek to prove it would be false. The answer to such an objection, as given by Sankarites, is that even that which is false may serve to show its own falsehood and the truth of something else, just as in the case of acquired perception, e.g. in the case of surabhi-candana, "fragrant sandal,” the sense of sight may reveal the smell as well as the colour. But the counter-reply to this answer naturally raises the question whether the false scriptures or other proofs are really existent or not; if they are, then unqualified monism fails; for their existence would necessarily mean dualism. If, on the other hand, they do not exist at all, then they cannot prove anything. The answer of Sankara, that even the false can prove the true, just as a line (a unit) by the side of zeros might signify various numbers, is incorrect; for the line is like the alphabet signs in a word and like them can recall the number for which it is conventionally accepted (sanketita), and is therefore not false (rekhāpi varne padāmīva arthe sanketite tam smārayatīti no kimcid atra mithyā asti).
Nor can it be maintained that the bondage of sorrow, etc. is not real; for it is felt to be so through the direct testimony of the experience of the spirit (sāksin) 3. Its unreality or falsehood cannot be proved by the opponent; for with him truth is differenceless (nirviseșa): but any attempt to prove anything involves duality between that which is to be proved and that whereby it is to be
aham-pratyayasya ātma-visayatvāt. Nyāya-sudhā, p. 27. It also distinguishes two words of the same form, aham, though one is an avyaya word and the other the nominative singular of the word asmad. It is the former that is used to denote an evolutionary product of prakrti, whereas the latter denotes the self.
. Several other examples of this type furnished by Sankara and his followers are here given and refuted in the same manner.
3 duḥkhādi-bandha-satyatāyām sākşi-pratyakşam eva upanyastam. Ibid. p. 30.