History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

Page 1913

XXV]
Rāmānuja and Madhva
97
admitted that a denial on Madhva lines of the classification of categories as dravya and adravya is illogical; it must be held that the adravya, though entirely different from dravya, remains in association with it and expresses its nature as characters of qualities. Parakala Yati then takes up a number of Upanisad passages and tries to show that, if distinction of qualities and substances is not admitted, then most of the śruti texts are inadmissible.
There are some Madhvas who hold that there is both difference and identity, and that even with careful observation the dravya and the adravya cannot be distinguished, and therefore no distinction can be made between dravya and adravya as the Rāmānujas make. To this Parakala Yati replies that the rule that determines the reality of anything must be based upon the principle of non-contradiction and then unconditional invariability1. The expression "blue jug," wherein the "jugness" and "blueness" may appear in one, may be contradicted by other equally valid expressions, such as "blueness in jug," "blue-coloured jug," and it would thus be ineffective to determine the nature of reality merely by following the indication of the expression "blue jug", which may show an apparent identity between the blue and the jug. The very fact that the jug appears as qualified shows that it has a distinction in the quality that qualifies it. Nor can it be said that because a particular colour is always associated with a particular substance that colour and substance are one and the same; for a conch-shell associated with white colour may also sometimes appear as yellow. Moreover, when one substance carries with it many qualities, it cannot be regarded as being at the same time identical with all the manifold qualities. The distinction of substances on the basis of qualities will also be erroneous, if, like qualities, the special natures of the substances be themselves naturally different3. If a thing can be at the same time identical with many qualities, then that involves acceptance of the Jaina view of saptabhangi. Thus, from whatever point of view the Madhva attempt to refute the classification of dravya and adravya is examined, it is found to be faulty and invalid.
1 yastu abadhito nanyathā-siddhaś ca pratyayaḥ sa evārtham vyavasthāpayati. Ibid, p. 30.
2 kiñca paraspara-bhinnair guṇair ekasya guninaḥ abhedo'pi na ghatate iti tad-abhedopajivanena ity uktir api ayuktā.... Ibid. p. 33.
3 gunagata-bheda-vyavahāro nir-nibandhanaśca syat yadi guṇavat guṇidharmaviseşah svata eva syat. Ibid.