History of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007593
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication Year: 1922
Total Pages: 2517
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 125 MB

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Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH.
is, the absolute, though changeable within it, is absolutely selfcontained and self-sustained, and is entirely unaffected by anything outside it.
Twenty-third Objection. The Sankarites urge that since consciousness is unproduced it cannot be many, for whatever is many is produced, e.g. the jug. If it is a pure consciousness which appears as many through the conditioning factors of avidya, it may be asked in this connection whether, if the pure consciousness cannot be differentiated from anything else, it may as well be one with the body also, which is contrary to Sankara's thesis. If, however, it is replied that the so-called difference between the body and the pure consciousness is only a false difference, then it would have to be admitted and that would militate against the changeless character of Brahman as held by the Sankarites. Again, if the real difference between the body and the pure consciousness be denied, then it may be urged that the proposition following from it is that things which in reality differ are produced (e.g. the jug); but according to the Sankarites jug, etc., are also not different from Brahman, and thus a proposition like the above cannot be quoted in support. Moreover, since the avidya is unproduced, it follows that according to the maxim of the Sankarites it would not be different from Brahman which, however, the Sankarites would undoubtedly be slow to accept. It cannot also be held that an awareness does not differ from another awareness on the supposition that different awarenesses are but seeming forms imposed upon the same consciousness, for so long as we speak of difference we speak only of apparent difference and of apparent divergent forms; and if the apparent divergent forms are admitted, it cannot be said that they are not different. Again, it is urged that the same moon appears as many through wavy water, so it is the same awareness that appears as many, though these are identically one. To this the reply is that the analogy is false. The image-moon is not identical with the moon, so the appearances are not identical with awareness. If it is said that all image-moons are false, then on the same analogy all awarenesses may be false and then if only one consciousness be true as a ground of all awarenesses then all awarenesses may be said to be equally true or equally false. Again, as to the view that the principle of consciousness as such does not differ from individual cognitions, such a position is untenable, because the Rāmānujists