Outlines of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007308
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: M Hiriyanna
Publisher: George Allen and Unwin Ltd
Publication Year: 1932
Total Pages: 419
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 40 MB

Page 388

388 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY according to the doctrine, to show anything but itself. To take an example from the physical sphere, jñāna is like light, which can reveal the presence of a jar (say) as well as of its own, but cannot itself know either, its revelation of things being always for another. It exists not for itself but for someone else. Its teleology takes us beyond it. The classification of things here is accordingly not into jada and cetana, but jada ('matter') and ajada' ('the immaterial'), where the second term stands for cetana and what is unlike it but is yet distinct from jada. Jñāna pertains to one or other of the two kinds of spiritual entities recognized in the system, viz. jivas and Isvara. It is consequently described as dharmabhūta-jñāna--literally 'subsidiary or attributive jñāna which implies that there is substantive jñāna also. The various jivas and Isvara are jñāna in this higher sense. They are compared to the flame of a lamp to which belongs and from which proceeds their dharma-bhūta-jñāna like rays. This jñāna is supposed to be eternally associated with a subject--whether jiva or Iśvara-and constitutes its unique adjunct. When it flows out,' as it is expressed, from the subject to which it belongs and comes into contact with an object, it is able to manifest that object to it. Throughout mundane existence, it functions in a more or less restricted manner but it ever endures. Even in deep sleep it is; but it does not function then and does not therefore show itself, the theory being that jñāna is known only along with some object or not at all.3 Then the jīva remains self-conscious along with the unrevealed presence of its dharma-bhuta-jñāna. In dreams, as will be seen in the next section, the actual presence is postulated of the objects dreamt of. Hence jñāna also is then known; but its action being much more impeded than during waking, the knowledge of dream-objects is dim and hazy. In mokşa, on the other hand, entirely free action is 1 Yatindra-mata-dipika (Anandasrama Series), p. 51. - Jñana, though attributive to jiva or Isvara, is in itself regarded as a 'substance,' as will become clear later. 3 In the case of Isvara the dharma-bhūta-jfāna, being all-pervasive, does not contract or expand; but yet it undergoes transformations. The consequent changes of form are what are meant by divine knowledge, divine grace, etc.