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250 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY said, but in a transcendental manner all the particular cows that exist now or ever existed or are going to exist, though only as belonging to that class. This knowledge of all the particulars falling under a universal when that universal itself becomes the object of perception is regarded as a case of alaukika-pratyakşa. (2) Again when we see a rose at a distance we apprehend its redness, form, etc., directly; and we may also become conscious then of its fragrance by virtue of the impression left on our mind by a past experience of that quality in the rose. But the flower being by supposition too far from us we cannot ascribe it to ordinary perception. This is regarded as another case of alaukikapratyakşa. The psychological truth involved here is the familiar one that all percepts are partly presentative and partly representative. (3) The last variety is termed yogic perception. It brings man face to face with supersensuous objects like atoms, dharma, etc.; and its acquisition means the development of mystical power through a long course of discipline which is as much moral as mental. It is described as perception, though the senses do not co-operate in it, on account of the complete vividness of view which it is supposed to yield.
We have yet to draw attention to the distinction between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. All perceptual knowledge, according to the doctrine, is expressible in the form of a judgment. Even what appears as an isolated percept really stands for a judgment something predicated of something else. 'A horse' for example is equivalent to 'an object possessing the characteristic of horse-ness.' In other words, perception as familiarly known to us is complex in its character, and it is therefore described as determinate. (savikalpaka). Now, according to the atomistic standpoint of the system, all complex things are explained as the result of a putting together of the simples constituting them. The complex of savikalpaka also is brought under this rule, and it is assumed that it presupposes necessarily simple or nirvikalpaka pratyakşa, which presents the isolated object altogether uncharacterized. Thus if at any time we cognize
1 SM. p. 255.