Outlines of Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 007308
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: M Hiriyanna
Publisher: George Allen and Unwin Ltd
Publication Year: 1932
Total Pages: 419
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 40 MB

Page 235

NYAYA-VAISESIKA
235 Višesa ("Individuality').-This is the differentia of ultimate things which are otherwise alike. Thus two atoms of earth or two selves in their intrinsic form resemble each other in every respect and if they should still be two, there must be a distinctive feature in each. That feature is its visesa. The need for it arises only in the case of such objects as cannot be distinguished otherwise; and they are ultimate entities like those we have just mentioned. Two jars may be exactly alike in size, colour, etc., but they can be distinguished from each other by means of the separateness of the material out of which they are made. So it is not necessary to assume višeşas in their case. Nor is it incumbent to seek their aid in distinguishing even ultimate entities like an earthatom and a water-atom, for the difference in the qualities that characterize them is sufficient for the purpose. The question will of course now arise as to how the višeşas differ from one another. To this there is no more satisfactory answer forthcoming than that they differentiate not only the ultimate entities to which they belong, but also themselves (svato-vyāvartaka). This category has been given up by the later followers of the doctrine.
Samavāya (Necessary Relation'). -We have mentioned that relations in this system are conceived as real. They are generally included in gunas, but there is one relation which is elevated to the rank of an independent category. It is samavāya which may be described as an intimate relation, for the separation of the relata connected by it necessarily implies the destruction of one at least of them. Such relata are described as ayuta-siddha, which means that of them one is invariably found associated with the other. There are five types of ayuta-siddha objects, which alone admit of samavāya relation. They are (1) dravya and guņa, (2) dravya
See Prof. Keith: Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 196 n. We have not taken into account the view of the Súlya in regard to samanya and višeşa about which there is some ambiguity. * For example, 'priority' (aparatva). Strictly, however, there is only one relation included in the guņas, viz. samyoga, which is parallel to samavāya. These are the only two cases in which one of the relata can be described as being in the other.