________________
ing between
and the
UNITY IN DIFFERENCE. existing in the same involves a contradiction. But this, we contend, is not borne out by facts of experience; nor is there any absolute law to the effect that identity should always and everywhere be destructive of difference. On the contrary, we have things with twofold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. For, the same thing which exists as clay or gold, or man &c. at the same time exists as jar, diadem or Ram. And no man is able to distinguish in Impossibi.
lity of rigidly an object,-e.g. Jạr or Ram,-placed before distinguishhim, which part is clay and which the Jar or the Cause which part is the universal character of Ram Effect or the and which the particular. Rather our thought and the finds its true expression in the following judgments, 'this Jar is clay' and 'Ram is a man'. Nor can it be maintained that a distinction is made between the cause and the universal as objects of the idea of persistence and the effect and the particular as objects of the notion of discontinuancedifference, in as much as, truly speaking, we have no perception of these two factors, in separation. However close we may look into a thing, we won't be able still
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Universal
Particular.
