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The relative
and indescriableness of
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. sense; because we deny the self-identical and self-complete nature of anything. In asserting existence of anything what we mean, on the other hand, is that it exists only so long it has a particular substance (Fa), a
particular locality (a), a particular period existence (918), and a particular attribute (Hra) in ableness of their particular combination. So long these
four elements are present in their particular combination, any object to which these elements belong may be safely said to exist. In short, the perception of these four elements in any object is quite sufficient to convince. us of its relative existence—an existence illusively thought of as absolute or self-complete by the realists or the commonsense philosophers. This we have discussed at length in the Form I. So, although in the Form V, we have emphasised on the indescribable nature of any thing, Judging it from the standpoint from which all the seemingly antagonistic elements namely, positive and negative aspects of a thing (c. f. Form III.), resolve themselves into a higher concrete reality without losing their respective distinctions, yet from the practical point of view
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