________________
finition of
tyaksha
JAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC. of relativity of thought and form, deemed it wise to classify it into two kinds, viz. (i) Direct and (ii) Indirect (927a and utta), Inference (agara), Testimony (112) and the like all coming within the purview of the latter.
To take the first, the Pratyaksha or the Direct knowledge is such that it reveals The Jain dithe objects as lying within the range of the formal Prasenses; while the other is called Paroksha or Indirect only in reference to the procedure of its revealing the objects of knowledge such as Inference (agaia) which is not object of direct perception.
Inference, again, is that kind of valid knowledge which is determinant of what man is to be proved, technically called Sadhya, arising from the sign or insignia called Linga standing in the relation of invariable concommitance (@jifa) with the same.
Such being the characteristic indication of Inference according to our logic, we mânexcludes thereby set aside first the view which maintains that (i) non-perception (aggafar), (ii) Identity (ahia) and (iii) Causality (Firšta) are but grounds of inference ; and secondly, also the view which declares that
Do of Anu
This A nu -
Buddhist and
71
