Unknown Pilgrims

SR No.: 007014
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: N Shanta
Publisher: Sri Satguru Publications Delhi
Publication Year: 1997
Total Pages: 820
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 19 MB

Page 323

Tattva, Reality
295
Space is that which gives all substances the possibility of assuming their proper places.39 Here it is necessary to make a distinction between the subtle notion of: lokākāśa, the space that can be perceived within the limits occupied by other substances both material and immaterial, namely, what is termed the universe and: alokākāśa, the space that is not perceived, from which the other substances are absent and where the ākāśa exists alone in its totality and to eternity; this is that which is non-universe, namely, empty space.40
v) Kāla
Among the ajivas, kāla, time, is in a class on its own.41 From the viewpoint of vyavahāra, time is that which permits parivartana, change, and pariņāma, modification in the other substances; from the viewpoint of niscaya, kāla is identical to vartanā, the minute, imperceptible, continual change within the interior of a substance, which permits a slow and gradual transformation. It is this factor which permits substances to continue in existence, while at the same time undergoing a slow and ceaseless transformation.42 Time as such is like an uninterrupted, eternal, unbounded flow, but in so far as it is associated with given substances - and it is this that enables them to follow their own existential course - it also is affected by successive modifications.43
By way of contrast to other substances which are astikāya, kāla is anastikāya (without a bodily form), it consists of particles that are so
39 Cf. DravSam 19.
40 Cf. DravSam 20; TS V, 12; US XXXVI, 7-8; with reference to PSa II, 41-42, Upadhye, ibid., p. 398, n. 3, explains: "The experience of this empty space is possible for the omniscient, since our ordinary experience is always relative. And since omniscience is capable of comprehending even empty space, there is no propriety of calling empty space as a mere theoretical abstraction: thus the Jaina authors accept the possibility of empty space.'
41 Cf. TS V, 39.
42 Cf. DravSam 21; TS V, 22.
43 CF. US XXXVI, 9.