New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

Page 97

Organs of Knowledge
89
Manyakheta in the south. While Haribhadra's field of activity was mainly related to ontology and the problems of non-absolutism and relativism, Akalanka's main concern was the science of logic and epistemology on which he composed the great works like Laghīyastraya, Nyāyaviniscaya and Pramāṇasamgraha etc., which provided a solid base for further development of the subject for centuries to come.
The Buddhists, the Nyāya-Vaibesika schools and the Sâmkhya thinkers had already made some progress in this field by composing valuable works on the subject and inventing technical terms and their definitions. Akalanka and his followers came a bit later in the arena with fresh interpretations, and terminology. They fully utilised the thought that had developed by that time in bringing out the implications of their own traditions giving them a new meaning in the light of new ideas and concepts. As a result they could give more precise definitions, sometimes effecting improvements that provoked further thought among the rival schools.
Definition of Organ of Knowledge (pramāna).
The great Buddhist logician Dharmakirti has defined pramāņa (valid organ of knowledge) as a cognition that is free from contradiction, 'freedom from contradiction' standing for the fulfilment of the desired end (arthakriyasthiti). The Naiyāyika philosophers have defined the pramāņa (valid organ of knowledge) as the condition of the experience of the (true) object. The Buddhists recognised the cognition as the valid organ (pramāna), while the Naiyāyikas included the auxiliary conditions of such cognition in the definition of an organ of knowledge (pramāņa). The Jaina logicians did not approve of this definition of the Naiyāyikas. They were in favour of admitting cognition as the organ of knowledge. Acārya Siddhasena defined the organ of knowledge (pramāņa) as cognition that reveals itself and others and is free from contradiction.? What is conducive to the cognition of the object is the organ of knowledge, that is, the most vital instrument (sādhakatama) of pramā or valid knowledge. Though this definition was generally agreed upon, there was difference of opinion about the most vital instrument. The Naiyāyikas considered the senses and the senseobject-contact as the most vital instrument' of valid knowledge (pramāna). The Jainas and the Buddhists, however, did not consider contact as the 'most vital insirument' but substituted the cognition itself for it. It is on this account that the use of the term 'cognition was considered necessary in the definition of an organ of knowledge (pramāņa).