New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

Page 33

Jaina Logic of Philosophical Period 25
The meaning of the word jñana in the old tradition was the same as that of the word pramana in the philosophical age. Vacaka Umäsväti has defined pramana as right knowledge. The knowledge which is unambiguous, non-discrepant and self-consistent is right. He included under mati and śruta all the instruments of valid knowledge accepted by different schools of logic, such as inference (anumana), analogy (upamana), verbal testimony (agama), implication (arthāpatti), probability (sambhava) and negation (abhäva). All these categories of epistemological tools involve the contact between the sense and the object as an essential condition, and as such they are included under mati and śruta.15
Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra is the first treatise on Jaina logic, composed in 32 kārikās (verses). It contains the definition of pramāṇa, its varieties and also the constituents of inferential syllogism. Though we do not find a developed discussion of the epistemological problem in the treatise, it occupies a respectable position in Jaina logic on account of its being a pioneer work on the subject.
Acarya Samantabhadra did not write any independent work on logic, yet his deep interest in logic is unambiguously revealed in his epoch-making works like the Apta-Mimāmsā and Svayambhustotra. He has described pramäṇa as the revealer of itself as well as the object. 16
Definition of Perceptual Knowledge (pratyakṣa pramāṇa) in Relevant Basic Texts-the Third Achievement
The Buddhist philosophers considered the sensory cognition as perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣa pramāṇa). The object is directly known by the senses and so the resultant knowledge is called 'perceptual' (pratyakṣa). Such knowledge is not conceptual (kalpanatmakam) and also not erroneous (bhrānta), which are the two specific characteristics of it.
The Naiyayikas define perceptual knowledge as that which arises when there is contact between the sense and the object.17 The neo-logicians have recognised two varieties of perceptual knowledge, viz. ordinary (laukika) and extraordinary (a-laukika).* In the former there is contact (sannikaṛşa) between the sense and
* In the Navya Nyaya three types of extraordinary perceptions are recognised viz. (1) yogic perception, (2) perception of a universal (sāmānya lakṣana pratyakṣa) and