New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

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New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
as a source of valid knowledge. In Jaina system there are five kinds of non-perceptual (paroksa) means of valid knowledge. The fifth among them is the Agama. The variety of the sources explain the various limitations of the cognitive power
Diversity of the Ontological Systems due to the Diversity of the Cognitive Faculties
Due to the diversity of the views of the cognitive powers there is diversity of ontological views. Different systems of philosophy have admitted different kinds of reals. Jaina philosophy believes in six substances (dravyas) and nine categories (tattvas). Similarly, there are twenty-five categories in Samkhya, four noble truths in Buddhism, sixteen in Nyāya and seven in the Vaiśesika system. Had there been any kind of uniformity in the conception of the valid source of knowledge, there would have been uniformity in the ontological conception as well. On account of the absence of the uniformity about the cognitive apparatus, there is a lack of unanimity about the ontological principles. Let us cite some examples in order to clarify the point:
(i) The sensualist systems regard the object as gross and possessed of form. The extra-sensualist systems believe also in the existence of formless and subtle objects. There are three opinions about the soul (atman).
• The soul as non-entity. • Monistic conception of the soul.
Pluralistic view of the souls. The sensualist systems do not believe in the existence of the soul. The soul is not perceptible by the senses and, therefore, the sensualists do not accept its existence. The extra-sensualists accept the reality of the soul. They are also divided into two schools. Among them the Vedāntists and the supporters of the monistic view have given sanction to monistic theories of the soul. Jainism has accepted plurality of the souls. The Nyāya nd Vaiseșika systems also have propounded pluralistic views
(ii) There are many views about the problem of permanence and transitoriness, that is, the doctrines of impermanence, permanence and permanence-cum-impermanence. All the things are impermanent according to Buddhism, while the Samkhya philosophers believe in permanence. Naiyāyikas believe both in permanence and impermanence. The Naiyāyikas regard space and soul as