New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

Page 116

· 108
New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
The rejecti 1 of the authenticity of memory on the ground of its not being f duced by the object would invalidate the authenticity of the info ence (anumāna) also. We infer the rise of the Pusya asterism from the presence of the Punarvasu asterism in the sky at present. In such inference the inferred object, viz. the Pusya asterism oli account of its absence at the time would not produce the inference, if the presence of an object were a necessary condition for the validity of the memory (of that object). Similarly, the inference of a foregoing asterism by means of a post-coming asterism would also be invalid. In the same way the inference of rainfall in the upper region on the sight of the flood in the lower region would not be a case of valid inference. All these instances are proofs against the argument that memory is not a valid organ on account of its not being produced by an object that is actually present before the knower.
Recognition (pratyabhijñā)
Memory is due to retention (dhāraņā) alone. But recognition has two conditions, viz. perception and memory. This is the reason why it is called a synthetic cognition. Memory is represented by the propositions like that person' (whom we met before), while recognition finds expression in judgments like 'this is the same person' (whom we saw before). The proposition 'this person' is a perceptual cognition while 'that person' is memory. A combination of these two cognitions is the recognition of the identity of the person in front with one seen in the past.
The herbivorous animal drinks water like the cow, but the carnivorous animal does not drink water like the cow, it licks water with the tongue. Between these two judgments the first is the recognition of similarity, while the latter embodies the recognition of dissimilarity. The following propositions express recognition based on relative aspects: 'This is smaller than that', 'this is bigger than that', 'this is farther than that', 'this is nearer than that', 'this is higher than that', 'this is lower than that'.
The knowledge of relation between the definiens (or name, samjña) and the definiendum (or nameable, samjñi) is also known by recognition. Somebody defined a swan as a bird that is capable of separating milk from water. The tree possessed of three-leaved bunches is called Butea Frondosa (palāśa). The listener is familiar neither with swan, nor with palāśa, but as soon as he hears the definitions from the speaker, the impressions are formed in his