New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

Page 110

102 New Dimensions in Jaina Logic
The Buddhist logician has recognised four kinds of perception, viz.,
1. Sensuous cognition.
2. Mental perception.
3. Self-cognition.
4. Transcendental perception.
In the Jaina tradition the self-cognition (svasamvedana) is not counted independently. The cognition, according to the Mimämsakas, reveals only the object and for its own revelation it depends on inference (anumana) from the objective cognition as the probans. The Naiyayikas admit that a cognition is known by another cognition that follows it (anuvyavasaya, apperception). The perceptual judgment (avāya) 'this is jar' is a case of determinative cognition (vyavasaya). The mental cognition of such perceptual judgement (avaya) is called apperception (anuvyavasaya). Such apperception is illustrated by the proposition 'I see that it is a jar'. The Madhyamika school of Buddhism also does not admit the selfluminosity of the cognition. The Buddhist logician Dharmakirti assigned an independent status to self-cognition as a variety of perception in order to distinguish his position from the above views regarding the problem. In the tradition of the Jainas the cognition is self-revealer as well as the revealer of others, which means that selfcognition is the universal characteristic of all cognitions, and as such it cannot be a specific aspect of the perceptual knowledge alone. Self-cognition, in fact, is an indeterminable experience or intuition characterising the consciousness. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy the word 'darśana' (intuition) stood for the experience of the generic aspect of an object while jñāna (cognition) stood for the specific aspect of an object. But this obviously needs a critical estimation and assessment. A substance is a composite of specific and generic characters and so how can a determinate cognition that knows only the specific character be a valid organ, while the intuition that is indeterminate and free from conceptual thought and is cognizant of only the generic character be considered as an invalid organ? Such an explanation also fails to expose the meaning of cognition and intuition in the case of the omniscient soul. And if such cognition and intuition are considered as taking place simultaneously, both should be assigned the status of a valid organ jointly, if the traditional interpretation of cognition and intuition is given credence to, and not either of the two individually. If they are accepted as wing in succession either