World of Philosophy

SR No.: 007005
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave
Publisher: Shanti Prakashan
Publication Year: 2011
Total Pages: 1002
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 30 MB

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the substantiality of dharmas (elements). For them dharmas exist objectively and independently. For Nāgārjuna there is nothing which exists obsolutely and objectively. Everything that exists is relative, dependent and thus, unreal. Dharmas of the Hīnayānists are subjective and unreal, Nāgārjuna argues that if a thing were objective and real, it would be able to exist by itself, it must not be in need of being understood through something else. But nothing is found in thought which is not relative, everything is relative to everything else. Relativity is the mark of the unreal, of the subject. For Nāgārjuna, our entire experience is purely subjective; things have only an apparent existence (samvrti) in reality. They are imaginary and unreal. Entire phenomenal world is unreal. He interpretes pratityasamutpada (Dependent origination) in terms of relativity and proves the dependent unreal nature of all elements. He says that there is no real independent existence of entities (pratyaya), since, there is no elements of existence (dharma) which comes into manifestation without conditions, therefore there is no dharma which is not Sünya i.e. devoid of real independent existence.11 Thus Phenomenal objects are unreal. The ground of phenomena can never be met within reason as reason by its very nature leads to insoluble antinomies. He, thus, comes to the conclusion that the Absolute Reality is Sūnya. It is Sūnya in the sense that it is transcendent to thought, it is indescribable, nondeterminate and non-dual (advayam tattvam). It is neither subject nor object. It is free from this duality. Subject-object duality indicates relativity and whatever is relative, dependent is unreal. He adopts more negative approach and says that this Reality is indescribable and it cannot even be equated with pure consciousness.
Nāgārjuna defines Reality as 'that which can only be directly realised, that which is quiescent, inexpressible, that which is non-discursive and non-dual.12 For him, Reality is indescribable, non-determinate thus it is Sūnya. When he says that reality is Sūnya, his idea is not different from that of Ašvaghosa. Reality is Sünya in the sense of non-describability, free from all empirical predicates. The word sünya is understood in two senses in Nāgārjuna's system. Firstly, it is sūnva from the point of view of phenomena. It means Svabhāvasūnya, i.e. devoid of independent substantial reality of its own. Secondly, from the absolute point of view, it means Prapañcaśünya i.e. devoid of verbalization, thought construction and plurality. It is indescribable in human language. It is transcendent to thought. It does not mean absolute blank. Nāgārjuna makes it very clear by saying that it cannot be called void or not void, or both or neither, but in order to indicate it, it is called void.13 His stand is more negative than that of Asvaghosa. He emphasizes the transcendental aspect of the Absolute. His dialectical approach does not allow him to identify this Absolute with even pure consciousness.
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