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ognizes the existence of positive, but never destroys it. If it is negative, how does it associate it with Brahman to produce the world of objects? If avidyā is negative then it is only absence of knowledge, but absence causes nothing. Nothing is produced out of nothing. To say that avidyā is both positive and negative will be a self-contradiction. 4. Māyā/avidyā is defined by the Advaitins as neither Being, nor nonBeing, nor both, nor neither. This distinction is circuitous and self-contradictory. If something is not being then it must be non-Being; and if it is not non-being then it must be Being: It cannot be both and neither. It must be one of the two. In this definition the Advaitins violate the principle of noncontradiction.
5. The presence of māyā/avidyā cannot be established by any valid means of knowledge. Ignorance is absence of knowledge, and absence can never be perceived. To perceive the absence of a pen on the table is to perceive the table, which is a positive entity. Māyā/avidyā cannot be inferred. It is not possible to infer something which is devoid of characteristics. If it possesses characteristics then it must be real entity. But according to Advaita, it is not. It cannot be proved on the basis of the Scripture for the Veda holds māyā is the mysterious power of Brahman. But Advaita maintains that Brahman being nirguna, it is devoid of this mysterious power also. 6. If what is stated by Advaita as regards the nature of avidyā has to be accepted, then it cannot be removed even by knowledge. What is this knowledge that removes avidyā? It is the knowledge of Brahman that shatters ignorance which is responsible for the world of objects. Now the question arises: Does this knowledge of Brahman have Brahman as the object of knowledge or is it the knowledge or consciousness that is the same as the Being of Brahman? The first alternative is not acceptable to Advaita, for Brahman can never be the object of one's knowledge, but same as one's ātman. The second alternative also does not make the removal of the knowledge of the world, which is due to ignorance. The knowledge of one's own self does not contradict the knowledge of the world. Apart from that, if Brahman is an object of my knowledge then the world is also an object of another act of knowledge. There are two different kinds of objects and two different kinds of knowledge situations. How can the knowledge of one act can cancel the knowledge of the other and show it to be due to ignorance? Hence it is absurd to say that knowledge of Brahman will remove the knowledge of the world of objects. 7. If avidyā is a positive entity, then its removal by knowledge is not possible. If ignorance means absence of knowledge of an object, then knowledge of that object alone can remove that ignorance. But if avidyā is a positive entity, then knowledge does not remove it. Advaita clearly holds that avidyā is a positive entity.
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| SR No. | 007005 |
| Book Title | World of Philosophy |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Christopher Key Chapple, Intaj Malek, Dilip Charan, Sunanda Shastri, Prashant Dave |
| Publisher | Shanti Prakashan |
| Publication Year | 2011 |
| Total Pages | 1002 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English |
| File Size | 30 MB |