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strict logical sense, similar to itself in another appearance to an appreciable degree. But they can sometimes be similar to such a low degree that doubts can be entertained about their similarity. When an appearance of a thing or a person or an event is similar to another appearance of a thing or a person or an event to an appreciable degree, we regard the two appearances as being appearances of the self-same thing or person or event; or we say that the particular having the first appearance and the particular having the second appearance are not two but one.
Atman and Brahman are not entities according to the Vedantin. As such, they cannot be said to be identical in the sense that their substances are the same. Again, Atman and Brahman cannot be characterised as they are bereft of characteristics (nirguna). As such, they cannot be said to be identical in the sense that their attributes are the same. Because of this, it is improper too to say that Atman and Brahman are similar to each other. According to the Vedantin, they are identical in a different sense. The identity of Atman and Brahman is to be understood in the sense that they are terms of identical or approximately identical significance. They stand for the selfsame feature of language and discourse. The term 'Atman' stands for the limit of factual discourse and the term 'Brahman' stands for the limit of any possible discourse. The former points to or shows the latter. What is shown is that the former is the maximum possible approximation of the latter.
According to Acharya Samkara, "apnoteh atteh atateh vaḤatma." Atma is that which gets, eats up and goes or grows. 'Brahman' comes from the root 'Brnha' that means 'to grow', 'to expand'. The two terms are highly potent in their significance and are used in philosophical, religious and cultural discourses as well. When they are used in the philosophical discourse, their meanings must not be got mixed up with that which they have in nonphilosophical discourses. It pays to increase our clarity in understanding the rules in language games and roles in forms of life if we explain them in the philosophical logical idiom.
The sense in which Atman and Brahman are said to be identical is different from the sense in which an empirical particular is said to be identical with itself or rather with different appearances of itself. We can distinguish the two by labeling the Atman-Brahman identity as conceptual identity and the identity of empirical particulars as factual identity. Accordingly, the statement made by the use of the sentence "This is that Devadatta" expresses factual identity of terms whereas the statement made by the use of the sentence "Atman is Brahman," or any of its variants expresses conceptual identity of terms. In order to avoid a possible confusion, however, the Advaita Vedantin says that Atman and Brahman are non-different. This is the maximum that the philosopher can say using language in order to clarify possible confusions of language use. Wittgestein's observation with regard
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