Indian Logic Part 02

SR No.: 006974
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1995
Total Pages: 236
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 20 MB

Page 21

10
INDIAN LOGIC
called 'apprehending its object. *22 Jayanta objects to this Buddhist position on the simple ground that an operation and the result concerned ought to be different from one another and that the former should temporally precede the latter, neither being possible in the case under consideration on the Buddhist's own showing; (Jayanta feels justified to ignore the Buddhist's supposition that the operation in question is just an apparent operation, for then there will be nothing worthwhile for the former to argue against).23 Hence Jayanta's final conclusion that a cognition is a result produced by the karana concerned (=the concerned causal aggregate) but not itself a karana;24 (that one cognition can act as karana to another Jayanta grants, what he objects to is that a cognition can act as karana to itself). Appealing to popular usage Jayanta argues : “We say 'one cognizes through eye', 'one cognizes through probans', we never say 'one cognizes through cognition'."25 The opponent pleads : “But a karana is never called karana unless it is actually producing a cognition"; Jayanta retorts : "That is true, but this does not mean that when a karana is actually producing a cognition what happens is that this cognition is acting as karana in relation to itself.”26 In conclusion the Buddhist is advised to concede that karana is what produces a cognition and that therefore one and the same cognition cannot be a karana as also the result produced by this karana. 27 (In passing Jayanta here refers to the idealist position according to which a cognition acts not only as a pramāņa as well as pramānaphala but also as its own object, but the refutation of this position is just promised.)28
Here closes Jayanta's consideration of the preliminary question as to how the Nyāyasūtra aphorism under consideration is to be understood as yielding a definition of what causes perceptual cognition, not a definition of perceptual cognition itself. As can be seen, this question is apparently unimportant and the various issues discussed by Jayanta in this connection make their appearance in a rather unexpected manner, but these are important issues and Jayanta's discussion of them is highly competent. He next takes up one by one the different words occurring in the aphorism in question and considers their precise import. This too was a common practice of Indian commentators but Jayanta's pursuance of it has an attraction of its own, for here again we find him discussing rather unexpectedly so many important issues in so competent a fashion.