Indian Logic Part 01

SR No.: 006973
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1992
Total Pages: 136
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 12 MB

Page 127

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INDIAN LOGIC
bist logicians consider verbal testimony (sabda) to be a form of inference. As for analogy (upamāna) they identify it with memory and memory heing not a source of valid knowledge according to them, they do not at all regard upamāna as a source of knowledge. 6 7 Again, implication: (arthapatti) and non-cognition (anupalabdhi) are reduced to inference by them. The Vaišeşikas also recognise only two indepedent sources of knowledge-viz. perception and inference. They reduce analogy (upamāna), implication and verbal testimony to inference. They consider even non-cognition to be a case of inference. 9 The Sānkhyas reduce analogy (upamāna) either to perception or to verbal testimony.?0 Again, according to them implication is a form of inference.71 And they regard non-cognition as a form of perception.". The Naiyāyikas reduce implication to inference73 and non-cognition to perception.74 The Prābhākaras too regard non-cognition as a case of perception.75 For the Jainas inference and testimony are two species of the indirect source. Again, according to them analogy (upamāna) is a form of recognition (pratyabhijña)?& which is a species of the indirect source of knowledge. Similarly, they consider cogitation (tarka) to be one
f the species of the indirect source of knowledge.?? As for noncognition and implication they are both reduced to inference by
them.
Pramāņa-Samplava Vs. Pramāņa-Viplava : There arises the question as to whether more than one organs of knowledge operate with regard to one and the same object or each organ has its own specific object. As the Buddhists uphold the doctrine of momentarism and reject the substance as unreal, there is no possibility, on their view, of object being grasped even by two perceptions. This being the case no question arises of there taking place a co-operation of two quite different organs of knowledge-perception and inference--in the cognition of one and the same object. Again, they hold that perception and inference have their own special fields of action inasmuch as the former grasps the particulars only and tbe latter universals only."And there is no third type of object that might be supposed to be common to both. So, perception can never grasp what is grasped by inference. The co-operation of different organs of our knowledge in - the cognition of one and the same object is impossible.