Illuminator of Jaina Tenets

SR No.: 006924
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Tulsi Acharya
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati
Publication Year: 1985
Total Pages: 252
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 25 MB

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Tluminator of Jaina Tenets
í Lustre x 28. dravyaparyāyātmakaṁ vastu prameyam.
parmāņavişaya iti yāvat.
(Aph.) The (cognizible) object is a real (analysable into) substance and modes. (XXVIII)
(Gloss) That is to say, (a real is) a (possible) object of valid cognition.
(Note) The Buddhist who follows the standpoint of rjusutra, straightline approach, only believes in modes and not substance. So also among European philosophers, there are many who hold that a real is only an aggregate of qualities without any supporting medium, that is, substance. They contend that no residuum apart from the attributes is open to inspection. Substance as a substratum of qualities is thus figment of imagination which is hypostatized by the realistic bias of the human mind. This is the contention of Hume, Berkelly and empiricists in general. The Jaina philosopher does not believe in homeless qualities floating about in the air without a local habitation. "Is substance felt or not? Is there the notion of substance ?" That there is such an idea accompanying all knowledge of qualities and modes is not susceptible of denial. The notion cannot be dismissed as subjective idea because that will lead to subiectivism and further will end in nihilism. The Jaina accordingly asserts that a real must be posited as what it is felt to be. A realist cannot admit the objectivity of the qualities without the objectivity of substance. This will amount to making fish of one and fowl of another, which is an unreasonable proposition. The Jaina defines a real accordingly as one which originates, ceases and continues. २९. सामान्यविशेष-सदस-न्नित्यानित्य-वाच्याऽवाच्याद्यनेकान्तात्मकम् । 29. sāmānyaviseșa-sadasan-nityānyitya-vācyāvācyādy-anekāntātmakam.
(Aph.) (The cognizable object is) universal-cum-particular, existentcum-nonexistent, eternal-cum-non-eternal, expressible-cum-nonexpressible and is thus indeterminate (in terms of formal contradiction).
(Note) Anekānta means not ekânta. Anta literally means end or extreme. Thus 'being' is one extreme and 'non-being is the other extreme of predication. This also holds good of eternal and non-eternal, and so on, which are given in formal logic as contradictories. According to pure logic these opposites are exclusive of one another and they cannot be combined in any one substratum. The opposition is absolute and unconditional. This may be called the absolutistic logic. The Jaina is non-absolutistic, and so also all philosophers like the Sāmkhya, the Vaibhāşika, the Mimāmsist and the non-monistic schools of Vedānta are non-absolutists inasmuch as they do not believe in the absolute opposition of the logical extremes, e.g., being and non-being, eternal and non-eternal, and so on. According to the Jaina, opposition is understandable only in the light of experience. We know that light and darkness are opposed because we do not see them together. No apriori knowledge of such opposition is possible. Accordingly the non-absolutist contends that if being and non-being are found together, and this finding is not contradicted by subsequent experience, we must conclude that there is no opposition between them. In other words, one is not exclusive of the other. We see a jar existing in its place and not existing in