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Rasa-nispatti-vicāra in Abhinavagupta
1557 "na tu yathā šankukā"dibhir abhyadhiyata, 'sthāyy eva vibhāvā"di-pratyāyyo rasyamānatvād rasa ucyata” iti. evam hi loképi kim na rasah, asatópi hi yatra rasaniyatā syāt tatra vastusatah katham na bhavisyati. tena sthāyi-pratitir anumitirūpā vācyā, na rasah. ata eva sūtre sthāyi-grahaņam na krtam. tat pratyuta śalyabhūtam syāt. kevalam aucityāt evam ucyate sthāyi rasibhūta iti. aucityam tu tat-sthāyi-gatatvena kāranā"ditayā prasiddham adhună carvanópayogitaya vibhāvā"ditvávalambanāt. tathā hi laukika-cittavrty anumāne kā rasatā. tena akaukika-camatkārā”tmā rasā”svādah smrty anumāna-laukika-sva-samvedanavilaksana eva. tathā hi laukikena anumānena samskrtah pramada"di na tātasthyena prati-padyate, api tu hrdaya-samvādā”tmaka-sahrdayatva-balāt purnībhavad-rasā"svādánkurībhāvena anumāna-smrtya”di-sopānam anaruhya eva tanmayıbhāvócita-carvaņā-prānataya.”
Gnoli translates. pp. 79, 80, ibid :
(But let us turn to Rasa, This is as we have said, different from the permanent sentiment] and it cannot absolutely be maintained, as Sankuka did, that what is called rasa is simply a permanent sentiment,* brought to our knowledge by the determinants, etc., and that, because this is the object of relish, it takes the name of rasa. For, if things were so, why should Rasa not exist also in everyday life ? For if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of relish, a real thing has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus, it is legitimate to say that the perception of a permanent mental state consists in an inference; but we certainly can not rightly say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the reason why Bharata has made no mention in the sūtra of the word "permanent sentiment;" on the contrary, the mention of it would have been a source of difficulties. Such expressions as - "The permanent sentiment becomes rasa”, are due to the correspondence (aucitya) only. This correspondence, to specify, is due to the fact that the very same things which were previously considered to be causes, etc., related to a given permanent sentiment, now serve to realize the gustation, and are thus presented in the form of ordinary self-cousciousness. Indeed, he who posseses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential processes, does not apprehend a young woman. etc., as if he were indifferent to her, but, by virtue of his sensibility-which quality is cousisting in a consent of heart, he rather apprehends her, without mounting on the steps of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with this young woman, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all fullness."
* Gnoli uses “permanent sentiment" for "permanent mental state." The use is not absolutely scientific and threfore not permissible.
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