Tattvartha Sutra

SR No.: 006796
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sukhlal Sanghavi, K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 596
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 10 MB

Page 232

CHAPTER ONE
59
naya apart from śruta naturally turns out to be in place. Again, however complete be a piece of cognition relating to a thing, in practice this cognition is invariably employed part by part. And this too is why it is in place to treat apart from each other naya that is of the nature of considered views taken partwise and śruta that is of the nature of the same taken in their totality.
Though ägama-pramāņa has been discussed even by the non-Jaina systems of philosophy, yet the doctrine of naya which is included in the same pramāṇa is established separately by the Jain system and that for the following reason, a reason sufficient to account for something that is special for this system. Generally, a man's cognitive operation is but partial in its coverage while he suffers from too much egoism and conceit. The result is that whatever little consideration he bestows on a subject tends to be treated by him as final and complete. And on account of the tendency in question he loses patience to give thought to the views of others. So ultimately he comes to mistakenly view his partial cognition as complete cognition. This mistaken view, in its turn, renders impossible a feeling of accord among persons holding true but different views concerning one and the same thing. The net result is that the door to a complete and true cognition is effectively barred.
When on any topic-e.g. the nature of soul-Å system of philosophy treats as totally true the partly true view of a person deemed authoritative by it, then the other systems of philosophy which hold views that are true but opposite to its own are held in contempt by it as unauthentic. Similarly, some other system of philosophy holds this first system in contempt, and both hold in contempt some third system. The result is that in place of mutual accord there crop up discord and conflict. So it is with a view to opening the door for a true and complete cognition and with a view to eliminating conflicts that the doctrine of naya has been established. Thereby it is indicated that each thinker, before he attributes the status of agama-pramāna to a view of his, should make sure whether or not this view manages to cover all aspects of the matter under consideration and as such deserves to be