Tattvartha Sutra

SR No.: 006796
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sukhlal Sanghavi, K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 596
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 10 MB

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54
TATTVĀRTHA SŪTRA
discriminate the real from the unreal, even true cognition on his part is in fact false cognition because it is thus a case of accidental-i.e. thoughtless-cognition just like a madman's cognition. 33.
The five forms of cognition mati, śruta etc. are so many modes of the power of consciousness, and to illumine their respective objects is their specific function. Hence it is that are all designated cognition. But the first three of them are understood to be of the form of jñāna as well as ajñāna. Thus we have mati-jñāna as well as mati-ajñāna, śruta-jñāna as well as śruta-ajñāna, avadhi-jñāna as well as avadhi-ajñāna—technically called vibhanga-jñāna.
Question: When the three modes mati etc. are called jñāna inasmuch as they make possible the apprehension of their respective objects then why are the same also called ajñāna ? For the two words jñāna and ajñāna, being mutually contradictory, cannot apply to the same object-just as light and darkness tannot exist at the same place.
Answer : All the above three modes are to be called jñana so far as the worldly convention is concerned but when they are here called jñāna as well as ajñāna that is done in conformity to the convention of a systematic discipline. For it is a convention of the spiritual discipline that the three cognitive modes mati, śruta and avadhi as belonging to a mithyādrsti person (i. e. a person devoid of samyak-darśana) are but ajñāna while the same as belonging to a samyak-drsti person i.e. a person possessed of samyak-darśana) are jñāna.
Question : It is not possible that only the samyak-drsti persons carry on authentic cognitive intercourse and not also the mithya-drsti ones. It is also not possible that a samyak-drsti person never has false cognition in the form of doubt or illusion while a mithyā-drsti person always has nothing but false cognition of this sort. Nor is it possible that the instruments of cognition like senseorgans etc. must be perfect and free from defect in the case of a samyak-drsti person while the same must be imperfect in the