________________
229
(1555) We find the soul established on the basis of 'I' notion from very early times. See Nyayabhāşya (3.1.15), Praśasta pādabhāşya (p. 360), Nyāyamañjuri (p. 429), Nyaya-vārtika (p. 341), etc..
(1557) The doubter cannot doubt his own existence. Compare Sankara's argument in his commentary on Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1.
Pakşa—That which has what is to be proved is called the pakşa, e. g. ‘Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky'-here mountain is the pakşa; the presence of fire on it must be doubtful so as to make it a worthy pakşa for the inference (sandigdha-sādhyavān pakṣaḥ). What is to be established is also called pa kşa-thesis; see Pramáņa-naya-tattvalokālankāra, 3.14-17. For a discussion of the constituents of anumāna (inference), see Tarkasangraha.
(1558) In the view of Prasastapāda, pleasure, pain and such attributes of the soul are experienced on account of the contact of soul and mind. He does not accept the view that if the attributes can be directly known, the substance also is directly known.
(1559-60) Substance-attribute-The Nyāya-Vaišeșika regards them as different entities, the Sārkhyas and Vedāntins as identical; the Mīmārsakas and the Jainas believe that there is bhedá bheda (both difference and non-difference) between them. According to the Buddhists there is nothing like a substance in which the attributes inhere, there is only the continuum of attributes.
The attributes cannot exist without their substrate :see Praśasta pāda (p. 360). See also Nyāyabhāşya (1.1.5), Nyāyasutra (3.2.40).
(1561-64) We find a similar argument in Nyāya Sū. 3.2.47ff and in Praśasta pādabháșya.
(1570) The Jainas alone regard the soul as, in a way, corporeal (murta) in the mundane state.
God-Like the Jaina, the Bauddha, the Sainkhya-Yoga, and the Mimarnsaka do not regard God as the creator of the world. Vedānta regards God as both the material cause and the
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org