Gandharavada

SR No.: 006739
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 400
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 18 MB

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Indrabhūti. Hence the souls must be regarded as many, not ubiquitous and not inactive (1957).
That the other world—the world of gods, and hellish beingsexists has been established in the discussion with Maurya who doubted the existence of the world of gods, and with Akam pita who had a doubt as to the existence of the world of hellish beings (1958).
It may be argued : Whether jīva (soul) and consciousness are looked upon as identical or not, the existence of the other world' cannot be proved. If the jiva is of the nature of consciousness, that is to say, identical with consciousness, then the latter being non-eternal and destructible, jiva too would be such and therefore there would be no otherworld characterised by going to another life. If it is said that the jīva is distinct from consciousness, and so eternal, and therefore there is another world, then soul would be non-knower like the akāśa which is different from knowle Ige, or like a block of wood (1959). And if the jiva being different from non-eternal consciousness be looked upon as eternal, then it could not be the doer and the enjoyer, for if being eternal it were doer-enjoyer it would be such always, since eternal things are uniform in nature. But this is not what we find. If soul were not the doer, there would be no other-world, because if it were there, there should be ‘other world' even for the siddhas (perfect souls). Even if soul is not enjoyer, it is futile to imagine ‘other world' because that which is non-enjoyer has not to enjoy any fruit of action in the other-world. If the soul were non-knower it would not transmigrate, move from one life to another as a log of wood does not move. Again being incorporeal like a kāśa, it would not transmigate. In the absence of transmigration, how could the other world' be established (1960)?
Lord Mahāvīra answers these arguments as follows: Metărya takes it for granted that whatever is capable of being produced is non-eternal like jar, etc.. Vijñāna (consciousness)