Gandharavada

SR No.: 006739
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 400
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 18 MB

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sense-perception is indirect like inference in which through a mark of inference e g. the attribute artificiality, one can only demonstrate an object as characterised by only one attribute viz. ‘non-eternality'. In sense-perception too through the organ of one attribute one can establish a thing as characterised by that attribute alone. Sense-perception does not give us a full knowledge of its object (1896).
Inferential knowledge of fire through the knowledge of smoke with the help of the remembrance of the relation cognised earlier is indirect; so sensuous perception too is indirect as in it the memory of convention grasped earlier is indispensable. On account of familiarity, this memory of convention takes place so immediately at times that one loses sight of it; still it is indispensable; otherwise one who has not the knowledge of the convention, would not have the knowledge 'This is jar' on seeing a jar. But this is not what we find. One perceives a jar as jar. Memory is thus as much indispensable to sense-perception as it is to inference, and so both are indirect. That knowledge alone is direct in which the soul does not require any help from any instrument, e. g. visual intuition (avadhi), intuition of mental modes (manah-paryaya) and pure and perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāna); but in sense-perception the soul requires the help of the sense-organs which are thus the instruments of the perceiver (akşa), soul and hence sense-perception is indirect like inference (1897).
It comes to this that leaving aside pure and perfect knowledge (kevala-jnana), intuition of mental modes (manahparyāya) and visual intuition (avadhi) all other cognitions are but inferential, indirect as have for their object a thing that is not directly perceived. The above mentioned pratyakşa and also inference establish the existence of hellish beings. Therefore they exist. The pratyakşa is in this particular case the pure and perfect knowledge of Mahavira's The inference is as under : There must be some enjoyers of the fruit of extremely sinful actions, for that too is fruit of karma like the fruit of the low and middling types of karman. Lower Creatures and human