Gandharavada

SR No.: 006739
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 400
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 18 MB

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could be rebuffed by pointing out that consciousness does not reappear even when Air is pumped in. Similarly it does not reappear even when Fire (Heat) is introduced. If it is urged that consciousness is not observed in a dead body on account of the absence of a special type of Fire, Air, then this is but another name for the soul (1655).
Vāyubhūti feels that Mahāvīra's statement that consciousness does not pertain to the aggregate of elements is one that contradicts direct perception as it is there that it is actually perceived. You cannot deny the jar its colour. Mahā vīra says it is not so as there is an inference that sets aside this sense-perception. We see green grass where there is an aggregate of Earth and Water, but this does not inean that it is a product of the aggregate of these; we have an inference that establishes the existence of grass-seeds -- the material cause of grass. Similarly in the present context there is an inference establishing the existence of atman of which consciousness is an attribute and which is distinct from the elements. In fact, it is Váyubhūti's stand that consciousness exists in each element because it exists in their aggregate that contradicts direct perception as consciousness is not perceived in any of the elements (1656).
The inference establishing the existence of the soul as distinct from the elements or sense-organs is as follows :Consciousness belongs to something distinct from the elements or sense-organs (Thesis), because it remembers what has been cognised earlier by the elements or sense-organs (Reason); as consciousness is an attribute of Devadatta who remembers what has been cognised earlier through five windows (Example). The purport is that if there is an individual thing that remembers all that has been cognised by many it must be distinct from them. If it be not distinct but identical, it being one could not remember what was cognised by many, as a mental cognition cognising sound, etc. can cognise that alone. Moreover, if Vayubhūti's argument were to be pursued, it would end with Devadatta's being identical with the five windows. If