Gandharavada

SR No.: 006739
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Esther A Solomon
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyasabha
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 400
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 18 MB

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instrument of grasping and the thing .grasped also does not exist, e.g. in the case of ether.
(4) The enjoyer of the body, etc. exists, because they are things to be enjoyed; as man is the enjoyer of food, clothes, etc.. That which has no enjoyer is also not a thing to be enjoyed e. g. the ass's horn. But the enjoyables body, etc. exist and therefore they must have an enjoyer. The soul is this enjoyer..
(5) The lord (owner) of the body, etc. exists, because they are of the form of an aggregate or because they are corporeal or sensuous or visible or due to any such reason which is not inconclusive; as the lord of the house, etc. exists; what is without a lord is also not of the form of an aggregate; nor is it corporeal etc. e. g. sky-flower. And body, etc. are of the form of an aggregate, are corporeal, etc.; therefore, their lord must exist. The jiva is this lord (1567-1569).
It stands to reason that the body, etc. must have a maker, enjoyer, etc., but does it follow that the jiva is all this? Yes, it does, for the concepts of God, etc. do not stand the test of reason. One may also feel inclined to argue that these reasons are of the types called viruddha (contradictory) for they establish just the opposite of what is meant to be established. Potters and others who are agents and so on are seen to be corporeal, of the form of a collocation, non-eternal, etc. and hence the jiva also would be established as being of this nature, while our conception of jiva is just the opposite of this. But this is not true for as long as the jiva is in the transmigratory condition, it is, in a way, of this nature – corporeal, etc., because it is enveloped by the aggregate of the eight-fold material karman. Hence what has been established is not the opposite of what was intended to be established (1570).
Moreover, the very fact that Indrabhūti has a doubt establishes the existence of the soul. X sees something which has particular dimensions etc. X has a doubt whether it is a man or the trunk of a tree, because he has noticed only the common features, dimension, etc., but not noticed the particular