Epitome of Jainism

SR No.: 006737
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K B Jindal
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi
Publication Year: 1988
Total Pages: 248
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 13 MB

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Panchastikayasara Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this Vyavahara Naya, though it recognises in it the soul of goodness and an element of partial truth.
(iv) Riju Sätra
This Riju Sútra is the extreme opposite of Samgraha Naya. The latter denies all difference whereas Riju Sûtra denies all continuity and identity. Reality is concentrated to mathematical present. It is purely momentary. In this respect it is still narrower than the vyavahâric present. At least for vyavahâra view there is a tolerable duration; for, the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this Riju Sútra Naya, a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment. The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet. Hence a thing, as being in the "no-more
hot-yet”, is sheer contradiction. If it is real at all, it must be in the present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this Riju Sútra view and Buddhistic metaphysics. Its aim is, as that of Buddhism, to expose the pretensions of an unchanging metaphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to such a conception of changeless substratum, Buddhist metaphysics adopts Riju Sútra view and brings the centre of gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration. It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To over-emphasise the neglected element of change, as a set off against Vedanta and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality, is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to identify reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only real and to make it live in a metaphysical void, is to overshoot
s. This erroneous and uncalled for accent on change is to the detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality, without which change will have no meaning. It is this Riju Sútrabhâsa that the Jaina system asks us to beware of. If this principle is the sole criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing suici de, to employ a suggestive phrase of Bradley. (u) Sabda-Naya
The implication of terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and action may be referred to by appropriate words in the language. Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech. Thus the difference