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THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE.
be its own justification. In the former case, the evidence brings in a duality, in the latter, Adwaitism is condemned as unproved, as nothing can be its own proof."*
If Vedanta calls in the aid of Maya, Jainism declares it to be out of court, on the ground that that which does not exist has no right to be heard, or introduced. Nor does it allow Vedanta to open its mouth to formulate an argument in reply, since that would be the recoguition of the objector whose argument is to be met.
Further, as two or more irreconcilable attributes cannot inhere in one substance, and since the attributes of consciousness and life are inconsistent with the nature of Mâyâ, which is jara, it follows that there are more substances than one in existence.
Vedanta, on the other hand, might retort that two or more substances possessing any attributes in common cannot be granted. The six substances must possess existence in common, in order to exist. They must, therefore, owe their origin to one and the same source, which alone is the real substance that exists.
To this Jainism might again object on the ground that if we grant a single substance of an unchanging nature as pure, quality-less existence, it is inconceivable how attributes and modifications can possibly arise from or in it. In reply to this, Vedanta points out that the attributes and qualities exist for perception alone and inhere in the intellect, not in things or substances. This, however, brings us back only to the point from which we started ; because the intellect"and the attributes which appertain to or inhere in it must both
** An Introduction to Jainisin hy N. Rangaji.
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