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THE HOLY TRINITY.
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already pointed out, lies in the wrong nomenclature, for it is not permissible to talk of will except in reference to limitations in its own nature. The true sense of the word freedom with reference to will, therefore, is that it cannot be imposed upon against its own choice.
In dealing with the question of freedom of will, the thing which is generally ignored by philosophers is the element of desire which determines its sphere of activity and makes it exert itself. It is under the influence of this element that will becomes manageable by intellect. Hence it becomes possible to calculate its operations even with mathematical precision, provided it be possible to know all its circumstances and motives. But this is impossible for ordinary humanity, though easy for those in whom omniscience or the true kind of clairvoyance has dawned.
We fear, we are differing from Bergson in laying down the above views on the question of individual freedom. But Bergson's fear of determinism, and his anxiety to keep the door closed against it, have carried him off his legs. He declines to define what his idea of freedom expresses, for the reason that that would ensure the victory of determinism against free will. The utmost that this acute thinker has committed himself to comes to no more than saying that freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs.' But he is careful enough to add immediately that this relation is indefinable, just because we are free. Thus, in spite of his fine analyses of the ideas of duration, extensity, multiplicity, and the like, one is entitled to dismiss him from mind, simply because he does not enable us to understand his notion of freedom. But taking the word in its ordinary significance, i.e., as implying an absence of restraint or necessity, it is obvious that the notion of absolute freedom is a purely imaginary concept. Even the gods' are not free from all kinds of necessity whatsoever. Fire must burn, water must flow, activity must ever remain opposed to inaction, and so forth. On Bergson's own showing, even pure duration itself is doomed to experience any particular sensation only once, in all its eternal enduring. But freedom means the power to do anything at will, and would be robbed of all its fascination and value if there remains a single must to bend its volition; for such a must would be clearly a symbol of necessity pure and simple. What, then, is the meaning of freedom of will?
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