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164 Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline
seen that Jain logic rests on two basic principles-Anekāntavāda or doctrine of non-absolutism and Nayavāda or doctrine of partial truths. We find in the field of Indian philosophical speculations a number of mutually antagonistic views and systems arising out of the fundamental standpoints of particularity and generality. These views and systems made it their prime concern to attack one another without caring for the element of truth that might underlie a rival view or system. Since from all these nothing transpires, the Jain logicians from their non-absolutist standpoint hold that all particular theories based on logic are true to a certain extent and from a certain point of view and that all cognition, be it of identity or of diversity, is valid to a certain extent and from a certain point of view. Thus a cognition is valid in relation to its own object but invalid when it discards its contradictory cognition as unreal. The seemingly contradictory cognitions should reveal in their respective way the nature of reality. This may be exemplified in terms of forest and trees. One may take note of the trees one by one in the form of particular entities while another may take note of the forest in general. Neither of these two cognitions can be regarded as solely true, i.e. true at the cost of the other, but both are partly true within their respective spheres.
From the aforesaid viewpoint the Jains attempt to reconcile the special controversy between eternalism and momentarism which has characterised the history of Indian philosophy by posulating that a thing is eternal insofar as it of the form of a continuous flow and momentary in so far as it undergoes a change or a new modification (paryāya) every moment. This may be exemplified by the total lifeactivity of a tree. Right from the begining uptil the time of its fructification it is in the form of a continuous flow. At the same time, when we grasp, one by one, the successively emerging elements, its lifeactivity is momentary which undergoes changes and modifications every
moment.
This non-absolutist standpoint also eliminates the controversy between the doctrines of definability and of indefinabilty by postualing that the gross entities of medium duration and extension are capable of definition while the innumerable subtle aspects of an entity's nature are not. Again, a thing is never cognized either solely through its positive traits or solely through its negative traits. Thus it is not selfcontradictory to view a thing as positive entity and also as a negative. The opposition between the doctrine of absolute presence of the effect in the cause and that of absolute absence of the effect in the cause