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stand-point and hold that the fundamental reality oonsists in abstract substantiality or unvaried existence and as such, is an undivided and indivisible one. This is by no means an unreasonable view. It should be observed that this view does not necessarily involve a denial of the derivative reality of the manifold of our experience. The Vedānta of the Māyāvāda School, however, lays exolusive emphasis on the ultimate abstract reality-so much so that it negatives altogether the real existence of all the experiential manifold. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika philosophers, again, were right in positing a substance which persists immutable so far as its essence is concerned, amidst the changing variants but stepped beyond reason's limits in keeping the substance rigidly separate from the modalities of experience. It may similarly be pointed out that even the theory of those thinkers who contend that language cannot express the reality as it is, is plausible to a certain extent. In a sense, all things and their percepts are particular ( Svalaksana, as the Buddhists say ), while words in a language are essentially but concepts and general ideas. The Buddhists point this out and may claim some justification for contending that words cannot properly indicate the things. They are, however, wrong in laying exclusive emphasis on the abstraot
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