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dualistico-monistic e. g. the system of Ramanuja ). We need not enter here into the discussions about the absolute monism of Sankara. For the purpose of the present section it is enough that the Maya-vāda School agrees with Jainas in refusing the nihilistio doctrine of the Buddhist School about the reality of the psychical being. But the Maya-vāda and the Jaina Philosophy are at the parting of their ways, when the former adopts the arguments of the Buddhist Sūnya - vāda School against the reality of the object.
In criticising nihilistic denial of the external reality, the Jainas point out that the Buddhist arguments are directed against the substantiality of matter only. But the objects of our cognition must not be material in all cases. Space ( Akāsa ), the principles of Motion and Rest (Dharma and Adharma), Time or the principle of Mutation (Kala ) are, according to the Jainas, reals external to the knowing self. Often, the object of study and investigation for a cogniser is another conscious self outside him. The Buddhist arguments do not touch the reality of these objective substances. As regards the material objects, the Jainas point out that gross' matter may be divisible into subtler parts but this does not mean that the former is unreal. A gross material object
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