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all times, in its entirety and in a form, perfectly understandable or expressible; it is never non-existent. As for instance. the ultimate soul (i. e. the Brahma). What however, is said to exist only at some place in some respects, at some time and in some manner, as for instance, the world of our empirical experience,-has only a practical existence, not the real existence.
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This goes to show that Vachaspati did not consider the application of opposing attributes to a thing impossible. In fact, he roundly admitted that it is by that method that we know the world of our experience and that this method revealed the true nature of that world,-which, according to him, was of course illusory.
Sankara's view that an object apprehended and talked of cannot be said to be inexpressible,' i. e. his objection about the reality of the fourth Bhanga will be considered shortly hereafter.
Lastly, the contention of Sankara that the Anekanta-vada leads to inactivity and want of impulse is best examined in connection with what Vachaspati says in his Bhamati. He says.
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............... The Syadvada rejects the absolute one-sided-ness in a thing....
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