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non-existents were admitted, it would make the peroeption of the existent impossible by sheer weight of their number. The perception of nonexistence, on the other hand, is conditioned by the differentiating operation of recollection which admits its own object only as the non-existent adjective to the fact of perception. It is thus that non-existence as a real element in the being of an existing thing can be yielded by all the recognised sources of valid knowledge.
The above may similarly be urged against the Buddbist and the Chárvāka views against the reality of non-existence, according to which negation can never be the subject matter of perception which deals with positive factual impressions and non-existence is at best a conception, more a subjective creation than anything real. It may also be pointed out against Cbárváka and the Buddhist contentions that non-existence often impresses us with as much insistent force as an existent fact, which shows that it is more tban a creature of imaginative oonception. Lastly, one may add that the Chärvakās by admitting varieties in the ultimate matter and the Buddhists by distinguishing in the first place the moments of consciousness from one another and then drawing at least a provisional distinction between
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