Adhyatmabindu

SR No.: 004030
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mitranandvijay, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1972
Total Pages: 108
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 8 MB

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the gospels of a spiritual teacher. This samyaktva of his is of the kşāyika or kşayo pašamikal type. Thus one who has acquired samyaktva spontaneously or with the help of a spiritual teacher knows that the worldly objects are not his, nor is he theirs, and as a result of it he does not form binding association with matter. (12)
Pramāṇa, Niksepa, Naya and their status : Pramana is that by which we measure i, e. know the objects. It is twofold-immediate and mediate. That which bears vivid reflection is immediate. By vividness is meant here the special internal purity effected by the removal of karmic impurities. The immediate pramāņa also is twofold-secondary (sāṁvyavaharika) and primary (mukhya). The former is again of two types, viz. sensory and quasi-sensory. The cognition of an external object, had through the sense organs, is known as sensory cognition. Regarding this sensory cognition Jainas maintain that a particular sense-organ cognises a particular object because it is endowed with a power to cognise that object only. According to Jainas mind is an anindriya (quasi-sense organ). And the cognition had through it is regarded as qnasi-sensory cognition. The primary immediate pramāņa is of two types, viz. partial and entire. The former class consists of two members, viz. avadhi (extra-sensory determinate cognition of spatially and temporally distant material objects) and manah. paryāya (knowledge of the modes of mind). The latter one is a one-membered class. Its member is omniscience (kevalajnana). This kevalajnana is purely self-dependent and immediately knows all the objects with all their modes.
The cognition that bears vague reflection is called mediate (parokşa) pramāņa. It is of five types, viz. memory, recognition, cogitation, inference and verbal testimony.
The ways of positing things are called nikṣepas. They are four-nama, sthapanā, dravya and bhāva. To posit a thing only in name is called nama. When we give a particular name to an object which does not possess the property denoted by that name, it is a case of nama-niksepa. To posit a thing by way of configuration is called sthapanāniksepa. In otherwords, here we take merely a figuration or symbol for the thing itself. To posit a thing by way of its past or future state is called dravyani kşepa. Here we know a thing by its past or future state. To posit a thing by way of its present state is called bhāvaniksera. This niksepa concentrates on the present state of a thing.
Naya grasps an aspect of a thing cognised by a pramana. Thus nayas are the expressions of partial truths. Nayas are classified into two main 1. For the explanation of the terms 'aupa'samika', 'kşāyika' and 'kṣāyopasamika one
may refer to the forthcoming topic 'Karma Theory in nut-shell'.