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Naya-karņikā
species, as, for instance, is the case with Chārvākism which makes wrong distinctions between substances and qualities, etc.
4) Rjusūtrābhāsa occurs when permanence, hence reality, of things is altogether denied, as is the case in the philosophy of Buddhism.
5) Śabdābhāsa, the verbal fallacy, occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of the Sabda Naya and deal with empty words as if they were applicable without reference to time, number, gender, etc., etc.
6) Samabhirūdhābhāsa consists in treating the words Indra, Sakra, Purandara, etc., as synonymous.
7) Evambhūtābhāsa lies in making the existence of a thing depend on the performance of the special function with reference to which it has been given a particular name, e.g., to say that a pūjārī is a nonentity because he is no longer engaged in performing pūjā, is fallacious.
From the above classification of Nayas it is clear that the first four of them relate to things (vācya) and the last three to words (vācaka). The former, strictly speaking, are the true standpoints of philosophy, since the latter are meant specially for linguists, grammarians and etymologists alone. But since the sāstras (scriptures) are couched in words only, and since the selection of words depends on the rules of grammar and is determined by their derivations, the last three standpoints have also to be taken into consideration, in the interpretation of scriptural text.
The above is necessarily a brief explanation of a subject which is capable of an enormous amplitude. If the reader is desirous of studying it fully, he should
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