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Nyāyāvatāra: 4, 5.
3. The necessity here for giving the definition of the well-known pramāṇas is to remove the stupidity from the mind of stupid people.
Pramāņa (valid knowledge), though well-known, is explained here to warn the foolish people from taking false knowledge as true.
अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् । प्रत्यक्षमितरद् ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया ॥४॥
4. Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is pratyakşa (direct knowledge or perception); the other is known as parokşa (indirect knowledge), in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance.
The words pratyakşa (direct knowledge) and parokşa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, pratyakşa (direct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses; while parokşa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony.
साध्याविनाभुनो लिङ्गात् साध्यनिश्चायकं स्मृतम् । अनुमानं तदभ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् समक्षवत् ॥५॥
5. The knowledge determinant of that which is to be proved (i.e., the major term, called in Sanskrit sādhya), derived through the mark (i.e., the middle term
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