Pravachanasara

SR No.: 003289
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: A N Upadhye
Publisher: Shrimad Rajchandra Ashram
Publication Year: 1964
Total Pages: 612
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 16 MB

Page 561

396
Translation of
[II, 19
according as it is looked at from the substantial and the modificational view-points.1
20. When the soul (in its course) is or will be born as a man, god or any one else, does it leave its substantiality?; if it does not leave, how is it different (in different births)??
21. A man (so long he has a human body) is not a god; nor is a god a man or a liberated being; if it is not so possible, how can their mutual non-difference be established?
22. All substances are non-different from the substantial viewpoint, but again they are different from the modificational view-point, because of the individual modification pervading it for the time. being.
23. According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise.3
24. There is no modification (such as human or divine etc.) as such which is permanent; nor there is any activity (of mundane beings) which is not the outcome of their nature. Even if the highest Dharma is without fruit, the activity (of mundane beings) is not without a fruit.
25. The Karma of the Nama type (i.e., the Nama-Karma which determines the various physical characteristics of the embodied beings)* overcomes the nature of the soul with its nature, makes him a man, a sub-human being, a denizen of hell or a god.
1. When it is said that a substance, without leaving its substantiality, undergoes various modifications, naturally there will be two view-points of looking at a substance according as our attention is mainly directed to the substance or towards the modifications: these are called dravyarthika-naya and paryayarthika-naya substantial and modificational view-points.
2. In various births, from the substantial view-point, the soul is the same behind different bodies; but it is different, if the bodies that envelop it in different births are taken into consideration; compare P. 17.
3. This is the famous Syadvāda or the Saptabhangi-naya of the Jainas. The human mind is limited; the human speech has its limitations; the world of nature is made up of infinite things, and each thing has an indefinite number of qualities and modes. Every point can be studied in its positive and negative aspects; and when the speech cannot assert both of them definitely, we adopt the alternative that a thing is indescribable. To explore all the characteristics is an endless task; so the author here concentrates his attention on existence and non-existence which together give rise to indescribability, and points out the seven possible alternative modes of assertion; see P. 14.
4. See note on I, 1 ante.