Pravachanasara

SR No.: 003289
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: A N Upadhye
Publisher: Shrimad Rajchandra Ashram
Publication Year: 1964
Total Pages: 612
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 16 MB

Page 113

80
Pravacanasāra
would be seven modes of predication: according to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance is, is not, is indescribable, is and is not, is and is indescribable, is not and is indescribable, and is, is not and is indescribable (II, 22-3).
SIDE-LIGHT ON THE BACK-GROUND OF SYÄDVĀDA.--This is the famous Saptabhangi or Syādvāda of Jainism. From the way in which Kundakunda has described this Syādvāda one thing is clear that the doctrinal elements, which have led the Jaina philosophers to enunciate such a seemingly (p. 84:] self-contradictory theory of conditional predications, are already present in Jainism. The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications, extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience. The senses are the indirect means of knowledge, and whatever they apprehend is partial like the perception of an elephant by those seven blind persons. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial, and it is valid only from a particular view-point: this leads to the Nayavāda of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is Syadvāda, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications, and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones: this peculiar position, leads us to conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability, which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements.1 Kundakunda makes it clear that Syādvāda is postulated because of this eternal flux of modifications.
SYĀDVĀDA IN HIGHER AND LOWER KNOWLEDGE.—Students, very much imbued with the spirit of Vedānta, have always looked upon this approach to reality as a process of uncertainty and indefiniteness of knowledge; and a question is very often raised whether Syādvāda refers to Higher knowledge or to lower knowledge or to both. If it refers to Higher knowledge, then Jainism is a quagmire of uncertain statements which lead to nowhere; if it refers to lower knowledge, then Jainism has not reached the plain of Higher knowledge; and if it refers to both, then Jainism, with such a logic of indefiniteness, will more mislead than lead its followers to its religious or spiritual destiny. These alternatives, that might be put forth by the Vedānta, whether accepted or rejected in parts or in toto, appear to be very dangerous. It is necessary, therefore, that the Jaina position should be clearly explained, It must be remembered that the terms Higher knowledge and lower knowledge are imported from Vedānta. According to Vedānta Higher knowledge consists in
1 For a detailed discussion about Syādvāda see my article in Jaina Gazette Vol. 26, pp.188-97. 2 In Pancastikāya it is said that the seven Bhangas are possible adesavasena, while in Pra
vacanasāra, pajjāyena du kenavi: practically it means the same, because paryāya or the modification is the essential subject of adesa, the statement of information.