Pravachanasara

SR No.: 003289
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: A N Upadhye
Publisher: Shrimad Rajchandra Ashram
Publication Year: 1964
Total Pages: 612
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 16 MB

Page 100

Introduction
67
In the condition of liberation the soul, according to Mimāmsā, exists without cognition, but Jainism holds that the liberated soul is an embodiment of cognition and knowledge and of all bliss: that may be one of the reasons why Mimāmsã and Jainism differ on the possibility of omniscience for a liberated soul. Puruşa of the Samkhya can be compared with Jaina Ātman, with the difference that Ātman in Jainism is not merely a spectator, unbound etc., but he is already bound by karmas and will one day be liberated. Sāmkhya has a tinge of idealism.1 Jainism is realistic, and Ātman is a substance endowed with sentiency as distinguished from pudgala or matter which is devoid of sentiency; these two constitute the objective existence with time etc. The Jaina Ātman is a permanent individuality and will have to be distinguished from Buddhistic Vijñānas which rise and disappear, one set giving rise to a corresponding set. In Brahmajālasutta various tenets, as distinguished from Buddhistic views, have been described: the classification is subjectwise and not systemwise. Jaina conceptions of spirit and matter agree to a great extent with the Sassatavāda2 which, it is interesting to note, is attributed to Sramaņas and Brāhmaṇas, and which is not correct in the eye of Kşaņikavāda of Buddhism. Jainism is pluralistic and the Atmans are many, nay infinite, and they retain their individualities even in liberation as distinguished from Advaita Vedānta wherein ultimately Atman is one and eternal, and all other forms of existence are not real but merely the shades of the same. In the temperate monism of (p. 71:) Rāmānuja, however, the souls as individuals possess reality. Unlike in the Nyāya system the soul in Jainism is not physically all-pervasive but of the same size as that of the body which it comes to occupy. Jainism does not accept any idea like the individual souls being drawn back into some Higher soul, Brahman or Távara, periodically.
COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE NATURE OF MATTER.- Matter according to Jainism is an objective antethesis of spirit; it is inanimate and perceptible as against spirit which cannot be perceived by senses. That matter is concrete, gross and perceptual is a thorough realistic position, and can be vey happily contrasted with modern ideal conceptions that matter is merely the way in which a fundametally mental universe appears to our finite intelligences. Both spirit and matter are reals; or to put in other words both the experiencing subject and the experienced object are real and genuine. The soul in samsāra is already associated with matter called karman since beginningless time. This association re
1 Dr. Belvalkar: 'Samkhya, Realism or Idealism', Dayānanda Commemoration volume,
Ajmer. 1934 pp. 19-24. 2 Discussing about the nature of Siddha, Kundakunda accepts a very modest and relative
position clearly stating that extremes are not acceptable. In this context (see Pañcāstikaya 37) quite incidentally a statement is made:
sassadam adha ucchedam bhavvam abhavvam ca sunnam idaram cal
vinnānam avinnānam na vi jujjadi asadi sabbhāve //37|| This gatha, so far as I understand it independent of the commentators, has in view śāśvatavada, Ucchedavāda, Sünyavāda and Vijñānaväda which are very often referred to in Buddhist texts. (see E. J. Thomas: The History of Buddhist thought, pp. 124 etc.) Ucchedavāda is said to have been the view of Ajita Kesakamabali.